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AN  APPROACH  TO  COMMUNICATION  EQUILIBRIA' 
BY FRANCOISE  FORGES 
The Nash equilibrium concept may be extended gradually when the rules of the game 
are interpreted in  a  wider  and  wider sense,  so  as  to  allow  preplay or  even  intraplay 
communication. A well-known extension of the Nash equilibrium is Aumann's correlated 
equilibrium, which  depends  only  on the normal form of  the game. Two other solution 
concepts for multistage games are proposed here: the extensive form correlated equilibrium, 
where the players can observe private extraneous signals at every stage and the communica- 
tion  equilibrium,  where  the  players are furthermore allowed  to  transmit inputs  to  an 
appropriate device at every stage. 
We show that the set of payoffs associated with each solution concept has a canonical 
representation (in the spirit of the revelation principle) and is a convex polyhedron. We 
also  provide  for  each  concept  a  "super-canonical" game  such  that the  set  of  payoffs 
associated  with the solution  concept is precisely the set of  Nash  equilibrium payoffs of 
this game. 
KEYWORDS:  Communication,  correlated equilibrium, multistage game,  Nash equilib- 
rium, noncooperative game. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE  PURPOSE  OF  THIS  PAPER is to  integrate in a synthetic presentation various 
equilibrium concepts involving preplay or intraplay communication between the 
players.  We  will  distinguish  several  classes  of  such  noncooperative  solution 
concepts associated with communication, by relating their use to the interpretation 
of the rules of the game. Three successive  extensions  of the Nash  equilibrium 
will  be  considered:  the  "(normal form)  correlated equilibrium", the  "extensive 
form correlated  equilibrium"  and the "communication  equilibrium."  The first  notion 
is due to Aumann (1974); the other two were first introduced for repeated games 
with incomplete information (in Forges (1984) and Forges (1982) respectively). 
Myerson (1986) also studied multistage games with communication and proposed 
a sequential rationality criterion in this context. 
The correlated equilibrium appears as an appropriate solution concept as soon 
as preplay communication is taken seriously. In this case, one cannot forbid the 
players to use a "correlation device" selecting a vector of signals, one for every 
player, before the beginning of the game. So one is led to the (Nash)  equilibria 
of the extended game including the preliminary lottery, which is a way of defining 
correlated equilibria.  (See  Aumann  (1985)  for  a stronger foundation  for this 
solution concept.) 
Since  in  this  first approach signals are only  sent  in the preplay phase,  the 
corresponding solution concept depends only on the normal form of the game; 
it can thus be referred to as "normal form correlated equilibrium." If, however, 
the situation to be analyzed has some duration (like a multistage game), one is 
tempted to extend the game by adding a lottery at every stage (not only at the 
'This  paper is based on the introduction of my Ph.D. thesis. I am very indebted to J.-F. Mertens, 
my thesis advisor, for his valuable suggestions; I also wish to acknowledge helpful comments from 
C. d'Aspremont. 
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beginning),  each  player  receiving  a  signal  about  its  outcome.  Or, in  a more 
descriptive vein, it seems natural that in a multistage game the players' knowledge 
of the state of the world can increase over time. One is led to allow each player 
to  observe privately extraneous signals, such as "sunspots",2 at every stage of 
the game. A notion  generalizing the correlation device  can be introduced: the 
autonomous device, which selects a vector of signals, one for each player, at every 
stage of the game (we will assume that such a device recalls its past outputs, so 
that the signals of different stages may be correlated). A (Nash)  equilibrium of 
the game extended by means of an autonomous device will be called an "extensive 
form correlated equilibrium." 
Now,  if the problem is to enable the players to coordinate their strategies at 
every stage of  the game, why not go  one  step further and add to the game a 
general "communication device", selecting outputs for the players at every stage 
but also receiving inputs from them? Such machines could be programmed so 
that the  signals that are sent depend  on  all the  past inputs and outputs; this 
involves both preplay and intraplay communication. In the same way as above, 
a solution  concept  can be associated; it will be referred to as "communication 
equilibrium." 
The use of communication devices acting at every stage of the game (including 
autonomous devices), though attractive, is hard to justify if the rules of the game 
are interpreted in a strict sense. In this case, there are no other intraplay communi- 
cation possibilities  than those consigned in the tree, so that the game is played 
following  a scenario of the form: before the beginning of the game, the players 
eventually meet and communicate; next, they go into separate cubicles where all 
their information comes from a central machine that controls the game. If such 
a strict point of view is adopted, the only communication that seems legitimate 
is preplay communication, corresponding to the normal form correlated equili- 
bria. (Autonomous devices and their associated extensive form correlated equili- 
bria can be justified with an intermediate interpretation of the game tree: in the 
previous scenario, the cubicles would have (differently oriented) windows through 
which the players could observe the course of the clouds ...  or sunspots.) 
Another point of view can be adopted: the specified rules of the game can be 
interpreted as providing a "reduced form" framework within which the players 
must interact, yet which does not preclude them from engaging in various forms 
of communication. While the analysis of the tree containing all the communication 
moves could be very complex,  the solution  concepts  considered here enable a 
manageable description. The different classes of equilibria correspond to various 
restrictions on the communication possibilities.  Obviously, many other variants 
are  conceivable:  one  could  focus  on  memoryless  communication  devices 
(modelling telephone networks), or on "direct communication," where the players 
2 The idea of referring to extrinsic signals as "sunspots" is taken from Cass and Shell (1983). The 
possibility of a connection between sunspot equilibria and (extensive form) correlated equilibria was 
pointed  out  to  me by J.-F. Mertens. Notice  that sunspot  equilibria were developed  in  a context 
completely different than the present one and from here the players may have private observations 
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are restricted to  public  announcements,  heard exactly  as they  are made  (see 
Farrell (1984)),  and so on. 
In the next sections, we formalize the solution concepts and show, for each of 
them, that the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs has a canonical representa- 
tion  (in the spirit of the revelation principle) and is a convex polyhedron.  We 
also  provide  for each  concept  a "super-canonical" game  such that the set of 
payoffs associated with the solution concept is precisely the set of standard Nash 
equilibrium payoffs of this game. 
2.  BASIC  DEFINITIONS 
We concentrate on a multistage game G with perfect  recall,  played by N players 
(indexed by n = 1, 2,.  ..,  N) during T periods (indexed by t = 1, 2,.  . .,  T). Period 
t  of  G  begins  with  a  move  of  nature; then  every  player  n  gets  additional 
information, which concerns the past moves, including those of nature; finally, 
the players move simultaneously to conclude period t. Let S,  be the (finite) set 
of possible additional information of player n at period t; the set of information 
of player n at period t is thus Ht _fIt=  S7; let M'  be the (finite) set of possible 
moves  for player  n  at period  t. We use  It  to  denote  the set of  all the pure 
behaviors available to player n at time t, i.e. the set of all mappings from H,  to 
MW.  The description of the game is completed by real payoff functions defined 
on the space  of  all histories (i.e., sequences  of  moves of all players, including 
nature). This is very close to von Neumann's definition of an extensive form; we 
discuss extensions to the more general extensive form of Kuhn in the concluding 
remarks. 
To refer to  events occurring before the beginning  of the game  G, it will be 
convenient (but in fact not necessary (see  Proposition 1)) to add a preliminary 
stage (denoted  "stage 0") to the description above. At stage 0, no information 
is given and no move is made; we take thus the convention that S'  and M'  are 
singletons for every n=  1,...  ,N. 
DEFINITION  1: A communication  device d for  G is a collection  {II, O,  P,:t = 
O,  ...  ,T; n =  1,...  ,N}  where In (resp., 07)  is a set of inputs (resp., outputs) for 
player n in period t and Pt is a transition probability that chooses  the outputs 
(in fl n 07)  as a function of the past and present inputs (in flt=H0  In 1n) and the 
past outputs  (in fn"  on). 
A communication device  is called  autonomous if it does  not involve any set 
of inputs (that is, I"  is a singleton set, for every n and t). 
A  correlation device is an autonomous  device  where all outputs precede the 
beginning of the game: it is completely described by sets On  of outputs for every 
player n(n = 1, . . . ,N)  together with a probability distribution P on 1In  o"  (i.e., 
0n _ oOn; 0o,  t  1, and In,  t  O,  are singleton sets). 
Given a communication  device  d, one  can define the extension  Gd  of  G as 
the new game  with perfect  recall obtained  by adding  d to G. For every  t = 0, ..  ., T, 1378  FRANCOISE  FORGES 
period t of  Gd  can be described as follows:  All players n =  1,...  ,N  get simul- 
taneously their new information in S,. They transmit simultaneously an input in 
1,  to the device d, which then selects a vector of outputs in Hln  O7, one for every 
player n = 1,...,  N, using P,. The players n = 1,...  ,N  make their move in M,. 
REMARK  1:  For the sake of simplicity and brevity, the sets 1,  and O  will be 
assumed to be finite. Using the results of Aumann (1964), the same analysis could 
be done for probability spaces (which could be required in a Bayesian approach). 
In particular, Proposition 1 holds in the general context, which justifies a posteriori 
the finiteness assumption. (Further details can be found in Forges (1985b).) 
REMARK  2:  If d is an autonomous device, the outputs of stage 0 (before the 
players get their information in S')  can as well be sent at stage 1 (after they get 
their information in S.') because the players cannot make any input in between. 
But it may be easier to think in terms of the events "preceding the beginning of 
the game." 
Now we turn to the associated solution concepts. 
DEFINITION  2:  A communication  equilibrium  (resp., extensive form correlated 
equilibrium; resp., normal form correlated equilibrium) in G is a Nash equilibrium 
in  the  extended  game  Gd  obtained  by  adding  a  communication  (resp., 
autonomous; resp., correlation) device d to the game G. 
A set of equilibrium payoffs can be associated with every class of devices; we 
denote by D (resp., Do; resp., C) the set of payoffs from communication equilibria 
(resp., extensive form correlated equilibria; resp., (normal form) correlated equili- 
bria). Obviously, C is a subset of Do which is itself included in D; these inclusions 
may be strict as the following  examples show. 
EXAMPLE  1:  D  is not included in Do. 
Nature selects at random one of the two following  payoff matrices shown in 
Figure 1, and informs player 1 of its choice. At the first stage, player 2 chooses 
L or R without knowing the true matrix. The pair of payoffs (0, 1) is not in Do 
but it is in D  where player 1 can reveal the choice  of nature to a device which 
suggests to player 2 to choose  L if T, R if B. This example illustrates that general 
L  R 
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FIGURE  2. 
communication  devices  (with inputs)  are not legitimate when the rules of the 
game are interpreted in a strict sense: in the original game tree, player 1 is a 
dummy player; the situation changes completely  if a communication device is 
added. 
EXAMPLE  2 (Myerson,  1986): Do is not included in C. 
At stage 1, player 1 has two possible actions, L and R; if player 1 chooses  L, 
the two players must move simultaneously at stage 2. The payoffs are as shown 
in Figure 2. Here, the pair of payoffs (3, 3) is in Do but not in C; indeed, if the 
game is described in normal form, (L, r) is strictly dominated by R  so that in 
any correlated equilibrium, player 2's payoff cannot exceed 2. But (3, 3) can be 
achieved by means of  a device  choosing  (1,  A) or (r, p)  at random just before 
stage 2. 
3.  A  CANONICAL  REPRESENTATION 
We will  now  establish that every set of  equilibrium payoffs has a  canonical 
representation. This  shows  in  particular that  the  "descriptive  approach"  to 
autonomous devices (where the players can observe extraneous signals from their 
outside  environment)  is  fully  equivalent to  the  "normative approach" (where 
devices are used for strategic coordination, i.e., recommendations are given to 
the  players).  In the  case  of  normal form correlated equilibria, the  canonical 
representation was obtained by Aumann (1974,  1985). Various other particular 
cases  are  known  under  the  name  "revelation  principle"  (see,  for  instance, 
Myerson, 1982). To get a precise statement, we need some terminology. 
DEFINITION  3:  A communication  device is called canonical if the set of inputs 
of every player n in period  t is a copy of  his set of additional information at 
that time (In = St)  and his set of outputs is a copy of the corresponding set of 
moves (0t  =Mt). 1380  FRANCOISE  FORGES 
An autonomous device is called canonical if the output to  every player n in 
period t consists of a pure strategy (in G) for stage t (O  = I'). 
A correlation  device is called canonical if the output to every player n consists 
of a pure strategy in G (On =HI,'). 
A communication (resp., extensive form correlated; resp., normal form corre- 
lated) equilibrium  is called canonical if it uses a canonical communication (resp., 
autonomous; resp., correlation) device and if every player reveals truthfully his 
knowledge (in the nonautonomous case) and follows the recommendation of the 
device. 
PROPOSITION  1:  D  (resp., Do; resp., C)  is the set of canonical communication 
(resp., extensive  form correlated; resp., normalform correlated) equilibrium  payoffs. 
PROOF:  The proof follows the scheme of the standard proof of the revelation 
principle.  For  example,  in  a  communication  equilibrium  using  an  arbitrary 
communication device d, the strategy of player n can be used to program a device 
d'  which  first receives  as  input  from player  n  his  private information,  next 
evaluates the input player n would originally have sent to d and transmits it to 
d, then receives the output d would originally have sent to player n, and finally 
evaluates the move to be made by player n, constituting its output to player n. 
The communication device d' formed by d and the d"'s considered as a whole 
is clearly canonical. The N-tuple of strategies where every player reports truthfully 
his knowledge  and plays the suggested move is an equilibrium in  Gd;  indeed, 
the players have less information, and thus less possible deviations, in Gd'  than 
in Gd. For extensive and normal form correlated equilibria, a similar construction 
goes through (or, in the latter case, see Aumann, 1985).  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  1 provides several corollaries. The first one3 states that to realize 
an equilibrium payoff in Do, the players do not need to observe private signals 
at every stage of the game: provided that they receive a private signal before the 
beginning of the game, one can restrict to public lotteries at the next stages. This 
strengthens the analogy with sunspot equilibria, sunspots being usually thought 
of as publicly observable. 
COROLLARY  1:  Every  equilibrium payoff  in  Do  can  be  achieved  using  an 
autonomous device where all outputs  from stage  1 on are public (private outputs 
being sent at stage 0). 
PROOF:  Let x E Do; x can be achieved by means of a canonical device d. Let 
us modify it into a new autonomous device d'. At stage 0, d' selects independently 
for every n and t - 1 a random permutation H,  of I';  the sequence (H7)  tB  is 
only transmitted to player n. At every stage t  - 1, d' selects outputs a,r in I'  as 
d  but  announces  publicly  Hl  (o,7),  n =  1, ...  ,N.  It is  easily  checked  that  d' 
satisfies our requirements.  Q.E.D. 
3Corollary  1 is a corollary of  Proposition  1 in the sense  that it uses the result that the sets of 
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4.  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  D,  D0,  AND  C,  AND  A  SUPER-CANONICAL 
REPRESENTATION 
We will  now  show  that, from a computational  point  of  view,  the concepts 
introduced  here  are  more  tractable than  the  Nash  equilibrium. The  sets  of 
equilibrium payoffs considered here have indeed a very simple structure. For C, 
this property was established by Aumann (1974, 1985). 
COROLLARY  2:  The sets D, Do, and C are (compact) convex polyhedra. 
PROOF:  The proof is given for D; it is similar for Do and C (see also Aumann, 
1985). Let us add to G an N + 1st player with zero payoff on every history and 
pure strategies (o  `r  N-_')'  where 
N  \/N  t-I  \  N 
or,N+1  Hl n, X  fl  n  l M)  M 
nIM, 
n=1  n=1  r=1  n=1 
Every canonical communication device for G can be described by a mixed strategy 
P of player N+  1. Indeed,  'N+1  is the typical mapping that would be used by 
a deterministic canonical device at stage t and even if Definition 1 was rather in 
terms of behavioral strategies, Kuhn's theorem (see  Kuhn,  1953) is applicable 
(since the devices have perfect recall). 
Let o0 = (on)  be the N-tuple  of pure strategies of players 1, . . . ,N  consisting 
of reporting the truth and playing the suggested move at every stage. The set of 
canonical  communication  equilibria in  G  can be represented as the set of  all 
mixed strategies P  of  player  N+1  such that (ao, P)  is an equilibrium in the 
N+1  person  game. This set  is  a convex  polyhedron  since  it is  described by 
finitely many linear inequalities (expressing that for every n, o" is preferable to 
any  other  pure  strategy). The  same  property holds  for  the  set  of  associated 
payoffs,  this  being  the  image  of  the  polyhedron  by  a  linear  mapping,  and 
hence for D.  Q.E.D. 
This characterization enables us to construct, for each given game G, a single 
communication  (resp., autonomous; resp., correlation) device d such that D (resp., 
Do; resp., C)  is precisely the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of Gd. To see why 
such a "super-canonical form" may be useful, observe that each canonical device 
constructed in Proposition 1 is designed with a particular communication (resp., 
autonomous;  resp., correlation) equilibrium in mind. Suppose that the players 
have to negotiate over and agree upon the design of the communication (resp., 
autonomous;  resp.,  correlation)  device.  Then  one  might  worry  that  these 
negotiations would lead to a leaking of private information (see Holmstrom and 
Myerson (1983) for a discussion of this problem). With the super-canonical form 
we will construct, the players do not have to bargain about the device to be used: 
one single extension of the underlying game G serves for all equilibrium payoffs 
in D  (resp., Do; resp., C). 
To construct a super-canonical communication device d, let xl,...,xk  denote 
the  extreme points  of  D;  they  can be  achieved  by  canonical  communication 1382  FRANCOISE  FORGES 
devices  dl,...,dk  respectively. d  corresponds to the following:  before the first 
stage, every player transmits to  d  the weights  wl,...  ,Wk  corresponding to the 
payoff  Ei wixi to  be  achieved;  d  chooses  then  among  d,, . . .,  dk  using  the 
probability  distribution  wl,...  ,Wk.  If  all  the  players  do  not  report the  same 
weights, d chooses according to the majority rule; this works for N B 3; if N = 2 
and the two  vectors of  weights are not identical,  d  sends  a specific output to 
both players. The equilibrium strategy of  every player (in the extended  game) 
may then include applying a punishment strategy (minmax in the original game) 
when the specific output is sent, preventing the opponent from reporting "wrong 
weights." 
For  Do  and  C,  consider  the  following  autonomous  device  d:  d  selects  a 
(k +1) -tuple  of  signals,  independently  of  each  other; for the  [th  component 
(1 -  [-  k),  d proceeds as dt; the last component consists of a random variable 
x  uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and is transmitted to every player at the first 
stage of the game; every player receives in addition his k-tuple of signals selected 
above (for C, all the signals are sent at the first stage; for D0, the procedure goes 
on at every stage). The players can thus decide to use the [th (1 -  [ -s k) component 
of their information if 
f-1  t 
E wi  x<  E wi 
i=O  i=O 
where we set wo  = 0. Using the result of Blackwell (1953), the uniform distribution 
on [0, 1] can be replaced by an appropriate distribution on the positive integers 
so that d uses only countably many outputs. 
REMARK:  The latter construction cannot be used for D because then outputs 
are selected  as a function  of  inputs from the players and a vector of  outputs 
associated  with  different canonical  devices  dl,...,dk  can  reveal  much  more 
information than a single output from one of the di's (think of the nonrevealing 
equilibrium and the completely revealing equilibrium in Example 1). 
5.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
REMARK  1:  We have seen that in general D  is strictly larger than Do and Do 
is strictly larger than C. There are however classes of games where C = D. This 
has some importance since the computations needed for C are conceptually less 
difficult. Also, if C = D, one can get the effect of a general communication device 
without violating  the  rules of  the  game.  Such  an equivalence  result was first 
established for a class of repeated games with incomplete information (Forges, 
1982, 1985a). Similar arguments can be applied to show that C = D in (one-shot) 
games of information transmission, a model studied for instance by Green and 
Stokey (1980)  and Crawford and Sobel  (1982),  where one  player has private 
information and sends  a signal to a second  player who then takes an action.4 
(See also Forges, 1985b.) 
4This  result requires the use of costless signals; therefore, it does not directly pertain to signalling 
games where signals are costly. COMMUNICATION  EQUILIBRIA  1383 
REMARK  2:  One may wonder whether the  communication  equilibrium is  a 
strictly noncooperative solution concept. Obviously, it is defined as a noncoopera- 
tive solution (Nash equilibrium) of an extension of the game. On the other hand, 
a communication device is a kind of outside enforcement mechanism, requiring 
some commitment of the players, in the sense that they are asked to make inputs. 
Now,  one  can  always give  every player the  option  of  not  sending  any input, 
provided that the device has a default message procedure, consisting of acting 
as if the player had sent some specified input. In any case, the communication 
devices are not directly connected to the original game; the only connection  is 
through the  players.  In particular, if the  device  makes recommendations,  the 
move remains the choice  of the player. Our extensions  of Aumann's correlated 
equilibrium are thus completely different from the one proposed by Moulin and 
Vial (1978)  and Gerard-Varet and Moulin  (1978): there, explicit commitments 
are required because the devices may play for the players. Finally, let us recall 
that the cooperative  aspect of the mechanism design phase can be avoided by 
using the "super-canonical form" of Section 4. 
REMARK  3:  A last remark concerns general extensive games. We focused  on 
games with a time structure, which is not the most general model for games in 
extensive form (unlike von Neumann's extensive games, Kuhn's extensive games 
are not endowed with a chronological order: see von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1953, pp. 73-76),  and the discussion  in Kuhn (1953)).  To extend the analysis 
to arbitrary extensive games, one is tempted to allow the output of the devices 
at any node to depend on the information set containing that node (the devices 
would be "attached" to the information sets as before to the stages; this amounts 
to working with the agent normal form of the game, which is obtained by giving 
the running of  every information set to a different agent). But even for games 
with the simple temporal structure  used here, this extension raises grave questions. 
To see this, let us consider an example. At the beginning of the game, nature 
chooses  one  of two payoff matrices, T or B, with probability 1/2  and informs 
player 1 of its choice. Player 1 then sends a message to his uninformed opponent, 
who has to take one of two possible  actions,  L or R. Here, we want signalling 
to model the idea that player 1 can "talk" to player 2: we allow thus a large set 
M  of messages,  say M = [0, 1] to simplify the analysis (we will come back to 
this later on), and we assume that signalling is costless. The payoffs are as shown 
in Figure 3.It is easily checked that D = {(0, 1)}, every communication equilibrium 
being  necessarily  nonrevealing:  independently  of  his  type,  player  1 wants to 
induce action L with the highest probability; hence player 2 can just maximize 
his expected payoff, leading him to play R (this holds for every set M). 
Now,  let us describe an autonomous device attached to the information sets 
and analyze its effects. As before, the device is not connected with the game, in 
the  sense  that  it  does  not  have  access  to  the  information  of  the  players;  in 
particular, it does not know whether T or B has been chosen by nature. Being 
autonomous,  the device  can only  send outputs,  it cannot get any information 
from the players. But the device consists of "connected branches," each branch 1384  FRANCOISE  FORGES 
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acting at an information set, so that it can send a different output to player 1 at 
the information set "T" and at the information set "B." 
Let us show that this enables achievement of a completely revealing equilibrium, 
where player 2 plays L if T and R if B. For this, let the autonomous device select 
a message  ,u uniformly in  M  and transmit it as an output to player  1 at his 
information set  T and to player 2 at any information set. No  output is sent to 
player 1 at the information set B. The equilibrium strategies are: for player 1, at 
T, send the message ,u received from the device; at B, send an arbitrary  message 
in M;  for player 2, play  L on ,u, R  on all the other messages. The associated 
payoff is (0.5, 1.5). Here, one uses that ,u is chosen uniformly in [0, 1], so that 
player 1 at B cannot "guess" ,  (the probability that a message m coincides with 
,u is zero). But the same analysis can be done with a large finite set M, in which 
case the equilibrium payoff has the form (0.5 + E/2,  1.5 -  E). 
Notice that this scenario is equivalent to the one corresponding to the "agent 
normal form" of the game where nature chooses between two individuals 1  T  and 
1  B  at the beginning. The autonomous device would not know whether player 1  T 
or 1B  has been selected to play the game but could transmit different outputs to 
each of them, to be used by the agent if he is active. 
This example illustrates that generalized devices are too powerful. If one applies 
to a multistage game the generalization of the autonomous  device designed to 
deal with arbitrary  extensive games, one can get a set of equilibrium payoffs not 
only larger than Do but larger than D. What is then the appropriate device for 
general extensive games? This question is left for future research. 
CORE, 34,  Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
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